Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person
Learn the definitions and actus reus/mens rea for each offence.
Criminal Assault and Battery (Criminal Justice Act 1988 s 39)
It is an offence to assault or beat any other person. Assault: creating fear of violence; battery: the actual violence. Common assault is any act which intentionally or recklessly causes another person to apprehend immediate and unlawful personal violence. Fagan v Met. Police Commissioner 1968: D drove over V's foot and stopped on the foot. D didn't move the car.
The police are not allowed to assault you (Wood v DPP 2008).
Actus reus of assault: Apprehension - V must believe that the force is imminent, there is no assault if it is obvious that the threat cannot be carried out. Immediate - This does have broad interpretation, particularly in cases where they have been put in fear where they didn't know what was going to happen to people: Smith v Chief Superintendent Woking Police 1983. Unlawful personal violence: there is no requirement of hostility, as shown in F v W. Berkshire A.H.A 1989. If it's a friendly prank or slap on the back, it can still be assault.
Can you assault people simply using words? Ireland 1997: yes. The words or actions must be an operating and substantial cause of fear: Martin 1881.
Mens rea of assault: Satisfied by intention or recklessness. R v Venna 1976: The dividing line between recklessness and intention is often indistinguishable. DPP v Savage 1992.
Battery: Any act by which D intentionally or recklessly inflicts unlawful force upon V without consent. Haystead 2000: D punched V. V dropped baby. D committed battery against V and the baby. Collins v Wilcox 1984: Actual infliction of unlawful force of another person - not injured. It is immaterial how battery was caused: body/instrument/car/weapon (Fagan). It was an accident to drive on V's foot but when he refused to remove the car, it was a battery. DPP v Santana-Bermudez 2003: V searched D, asked if he had anything that could harm her in his pocket. He said no, V stabbed herself with syringe. Omission: battery. In R v Brown, consent was defence. If V does consent and there's an assault, then the victim isn't consenting to the harm. Not consent if harm was intended to be caused, e.g. in fighting.
Offences Against the Person Act 1861 s.47 - ABH
There has to be an actual assault or battery; there has to be causation; and there has to be actual bodily harm. The assault has to cause the ABH. D must be the substantial and operating cause of the ABH. Roberts 1971: The 'natural result' of what D did. Thin skull rule applies: D must take V as he finds him.
ABH: anything that affects the health or comfort of V. It cannot be trifling or transient, and if psychiatric, must be beyond mere fear, distress or panic. Reigate; Chan-Fook: ABH is capable of including psychiatric injury... Need not be permanent, but must be more than a passing fear. Morris: A definition of ABH is wide enough to include pain or hurt which are not directly caused by the physical trauma (but there must be a causal link).
T v DPP 2003: V beaten up by youths, was knocked out. ABH.
Venna: Broken finger/fractured bone. ABH.
Donovan: Bruises. ABH.
DPP v Smith: Cut girlfriend's hair off! ABH.
Mens rea: Intention/recklessness: no intent to cause the actual injury, nor did they need to foresee the injury (but must have taken the risk). Spratt/Savage/Parmenter: Can you be responsible when the intentions weren't to cause the harm that occurred? Brady 2006: Correct definition of recklessness is in Cunningham (don't need to foresee the amount of harm caused.)
Offences Against the Person Act 1861 s. 20 - Wounding or inflicting GBH
Whosoever shall unlawfully and maliciously wound or inflict any GBH upon any other person.
Actus reus of malicious wounding: a break in the continuity of the skin (or can be internal). Bruises or burns which do not breach the skin do not count. Martin 1881: D extinguished lights in theatre and bolted doors, shouting "fire!" People ran to the doors and caused harm.
Clarence 1888: infected wife with gonorrhoea. If no assault, then no infliction of harm.
Mens rea: Maliciously: D intended (Woollin) or acknowledged the risk of physical harm. R v Sullivan 1981: D drove car down alley to scare people, thought he would just scare them.
Parmenter 1992: D injured 3 month son, argued that he didn't realise dropping babies would hurt them... Doesn't matter if they don't realise how much harm will occur.
Savage: Threw beer and glass slipped.
Infliction: Slightly narrower than causes: GBH may be inflicted either where D directly or violently inflicts it by assaulting V or where D has inflicted it by doing something intentionally which thought is not itself a direct application of force to the body of V does directly result in force being applied violently to V so he suffers GBH.
DPP v Smith 1961: "really serious bodily harm."
Saunders 1985: "serious bodily harm."
Bollom 2003: contextualising! Stamping on feet: could be worse for some people than others.
ABH: Broken fingers. GBH: Broken arm. ABH: Bloody nose. GBH: Broken nose.
Assault occasioning ABH (OAPA 1861 s 47)
Offences Against the Person Act 1861: s. 18 - Wounding or inflicting GBH with intent
1. Wounding with intention to do some GBH;
2. Wounding with intent to resist/prevent lawful apprehension or evade detainer;
3. Causing GBH with intent to do some GBH;
4. Resisting/preventing lawful apprehension or evade detainer.
AR/MR are much the same as s. 20; the word 'cause' is used rather than inflict, which has caused problems.
Mens rea: Woollin intention: virtually certain
D must intend to cause the GBH or intending to be resisting arrest
Only an intention to cause serious harm will suffice
Morrisson 1989: D was seized by V as he leapt through the window, V suffered injury. D's intent to resist arrest and subjective recklessness as to the GBH make D liable.
'Unlawful' means that there may be defences available.
Crime and Disorder 1998: Racially aggravated assaults
Racially aggravated assaults are more serious than ordinary assaults.
1. Racially aggravated wounding;
2. Racially aggravated GBH;
3. Racially aggravated ABH;
4. Racially aggravated common assault.
These are separate from the Offences Against the Person Act.
Liability for HIV Transmission
Dica 2004: D, who knows he has HIV, had unprotected sex with two women. D was charged with s. 20 (maliciously inflicting grievous bodily harm). The judge ruled that any consent by women was irrelevant. Court of Appeal allowed the appeal. S. 20 would have required an assault, but they were not to follow Clarence. The assault was not direct but still existed. Could they call it rape? Had they been defrauded to the nature of the act? It was ruled that they had not. How much knowledge do you need to invalidate consent? Women had consented to sex, but not the risk of a disease.
Konzani 2005: D, knowingly HIV+, repeatedly had unprotected sex with 3 women, telling none of his status. Each contracted the virus. He was convicted of s. 20, admitting he acted recklessly. D hid the status so the women could not consent to the risk. If D hides the status, they can't avoid liability for saying they thought they knew about it.
B 2006: D claimed V consented in rape. HIV status is not relevant under Sexual Offences Act 2003.
Dica and Konzani were prosecuted because of HIV: unlawful sex, as it is an assault.
B was rape but undisclosed HIV was used to try and show lack of consent.
Reform?
There are inconsistencies with language that make interpretation difficult
The presence of constructive liability in some of the offences
There is still debate over the extent of ham that D must risk
The unduly complex nature of s. 18
Coherence of the ladder of offences (the maximum penalties for s 47 and s 20 are the same: 5 years)
The Law Commission commented that it was 'defective on the grounds of both effectiveness and of justice.'
Their report No. 218 contained recommendations, but these were superseded by the Home Office's Consultation Paper on Violence 1998
Criminal Assault and Battery (Criminal Justice Act 1988 s 39)
It is an offence to assault or beat any other person. Assault: creating fear of violence; battery: the actual violence. Common assault is any act which intentionally or recklessly causes another person to apprehend immediate and unlawful personal violence. Fagan v Met. Police Commissioner 1968: D drove over V's foot and stopped on the foot. D didn't move the car.
The police are not allowed to assault you (Wood v DPP 2008).
Actus reus of assault: Apprehension - V must believe that the force is imminent, there is no assault if it is obvious that the threat cannot be carried out. Immediate - This does have broad interpretation, particularly in cases where they have been put in fear where they didn't know what was going to happen to people: Smith v Chief Superintendent Woking Police 1983. Unlawful personal violence: there is no requirement of hostility, as shown in F v W. Berkshire A.H.A 1989. If it's a friendly prank or slap on the back, it can still be assault.
Can you assault people simply using words? Ireland 1997: yes. The words or actions must be an operating and substantial cause of fear: Martin 1881.
Mens rea of assault: Satisfied by intention or recklessness. R v Venna 1976: The dividing line between recklessness and intention is often indistinguishable. DPP v Savage 1992.
Battery: Any act by which D intentionally or recklessly inflicts unlawful force upon V without consent. Haystead 2000: D punched V. V dropped baby. D committed battery against V and the baby. Collins v Wilcox 1984: Actual infliction of unlawful force of another person - not injured. It is immaterial how battery was caused: body/instrument/car/weapon (Fagan). It was an accident to drive on V's foot but when he refused to remove the car, it was a battery. DPP v Santana-Bermudez 2003: V searched D, asked if he had anything that could harm her in his pocket. He said no, V stabbed herself with syringe. Omission: battery. In R v Brown, consent was defence. If V does consent and there's an assault, then the victim isn't consenting to the harm. Not consent if harm was intended to be caused, e.g. in fighting.
Offences Against the Person Act 1861 s.47 - ABH
There has to be an actual assault or battery; there has to be causation; and there has to be actual bodily harm. The assault has to cause the ABH. D must be the substantial and operating cause of the ABH. Roberts 1971: The 'natural result' of what D did. Thin skull rule applies: D must take V as he finds him.
ABH: anything that affects the health or comfort of V. It cannot be trifling or transient, and if psychiatric, must be beyond mere fear, distress or panic. Reigate; Chan-Fook: ABH is capable of including psychiatric injury... Need not be permanent, but must be more than a passing fear. Morris: A definition of ABH is wide enough to include pain or hurt which are not directly caused by the physical trauma (but there must be a causal link).
T v DPP 2003: V beaten up by youths, was knocked out. ABH.
Venna: Broken finger/fractured bone. ABH.
Donovan: Bruises. ABH.
DPP v Smith: Cut girlfriend's hair off! ABH.
Mens rea: Intention/recklessness: no intent to cause the actual injury, nor did they need to foresee the injury (but must have taken the risk). Spratt/Savage/Parmenter: Can you be responsible when the intentions weren't to cause the harm that occurred? Brady 2006: Correct definition of recklessness is in Cunningham (don't need to foresee the amount of harm caused.)
Offences Against the Person Act 1861 s. 20 - Wounding or inflicting GBH
Whosoever shall unlawfully and maliciously wound or inflict any GBH upon any other person.
Actus reus of malicious wounding: a break in the continuity of the skin (or can be internal). Bruises or burns which do not breach the skin do not count. Martin 1881: D extinguished lights in theatre and bolted doors, shouting "fire!" People ran to the doors and caused harm.
Clarence 1888: infected wife with gonorrhoea. If no assault, then no infliction of harm.
Mens rea: Maliciously: D intended (Woollin) or acknowledged the risk of physical harm. R v Sullivan 1981: D drove car down alley to scare people, thought he would just scare them.
Parmenter 1992: D injured 3 month son, argued that he didn't realise dropping babies would hurt them... Doesn't matter if they don't realise how much harm will occur.
Savage: Threw beer and glass slipped.
Infliction: Slightly narrower than causes: GBH may be inflicted either where D directly or violently inflicts it by assaulting V or where D has inflicted it by doing something intentionally which thought is not itself a direct application of force to the body of V does directly result in force being applied violently to V so he suffers GBH.
DPP v Smith 1961: "really serious bodily harm."
Saunders 1985: "serious bodily harm."
Bollom 2003: contextualising! Stamping on feet: could be worse for some people than others.
ABH: Broken fingers. GBH: Broken arm. ABH: Bloody nose. GBH: Broken nose.
Assault occasioning ABH (OAPA 1861 s 47)
Offences Against the Person Act 1861: s. 18 - Wounding or inflicting GBH with intent
1. Wounding with intention to do some GBH;
2. Wounding with intent to resist/prevent lawful apprehension or evade detainer;
3. Causing GBH with intent to do some GBH;
4. Resisting/preventing lawful apprehension or evade detainer.
AR/MR are much the same as s. 20; the word 'cause' is used rather than inflict, which has caused problems.
Mens rea: Woollin intention: virtually certain
D must intend to cause the GBH or intending to be resisting arrest
Only an intention to cause serious harm will suffice
Morrisson 1989: D was seized by V as he leapt through the window, V suffered injury. D's intent to resist arrest and subjective recklessness as to the GBH make D liable.
'Unlawful' means that there may be defences available.
Crime and Disorder 1998: Racially aggravated assaults
Racially aggravated assaults are more serious than ordinary assaults.
1. Racially aggravated wounding;
2. Racially aggravated GBH;
3. Racially aggravated ABH;
4. Racially aggravated common assault.
These are separate from the Offences Against the Person Act.
Liability for HIV Transmission
Dica 2004: D, who knows he has HIV, had unprotected sex with two women. D was charged with s. 20 (maliciously inflicting grievous bodily harm). The judge ruled that any consent by women was irrelevant. Court of Appeal allowed the appeal. S. 20 would have required an assault, but they were not to follow Clarence. The assault was not direct but still existed. Could they call it rape? Had they been defrauded to the nature of the act? It was ruled that they had not. How much knowledge do you need to invalidate consent? Women had consented to sex, but not the risk of a disease.
Konzani 2005: D, knowingly HIV+, repeatedly had unprotected sex with 3 women, telling none of his status. Each contracted the virus. He was convicted of s. 20, admitting he acted recklessly. D hid the status so the women could not consent to the risk. If D hides the status, they can't avoid liability for saying they thought they knew about it.
B 2006: D claimed V consented in rape. HIV status is not relevant under Sexual Offences Act 2003.
Dica and Konzani were prosecuted because of HIV: unlawful sex, as it is an assault.
B was rape but undisclosed HIV was used to try and show lack of consent.
Reform?
There are inconsistencies with language that make interpretation difficult
The presence of constructive liability in some of the offences
There is still debate over the extent of ham that D must risk
The unduly complex nature of s. 18
Coherence of the ladder of offences (the maximum penalties for s 47 and s 20 are the same: 5 years)
The Law Commission commented that it was 'defective on the grounds of both effectiveness and of justice.'
Their report No. 218 contained recommendations, but these were superseded by the Home Office's Consultation Paper on Violence 1998