Actus Reus: The Guilty Act
Causation; omissions; voluntary conduct.
- Airedale NHS Trust v Bland 1993
o B had been at the Hillsborough disaster, survived but was in a vegetative state
o No further interest in being kept alive as there was no chance of recovery
o If treatment were withdrawn, would it be a breach of the doctors’ duty of care?
- Voluntary conduct:
o The accused must have a sufficient degree of control so they can fairly be punished for their actions
o D must be responsible for the behavior element of the actus reus
o If they don’t have control, they are in a state of ‘automatism’
§ Must’ve suffered a complete loss of voluntary control, caused by an external factor
§ D mustn’t be at fault in losing their control
§ If D is attacked by bees while he is driving and hits a parked car, he is not guilty of driving without due care and attention
§ Hill v Baxter 1958:
· D was charged with dangerous driving
· D claimed he had become unconscious at the wheel
· Held that if you are in the driving seat of a car, it is presumed that you are driving it, unless there is evidence to the contrary (e.g. epileptic fit, coma, attack by swarm of bees etc.)
· If you can predict that you may have an epileptic fit, there is a question as to whether the driver was reckless/dangerous
· If someone falls asleep, there was an earlier time when he was falling asleep and failed to perform the ‘elementary duty’ of staying awake
§ AG’s Reference (No. 2 of 1992) 1993:
· HGV driver killed two people on the motorway
· Three way motorway temporarily went into two lanes
· Driver steered onto the hard shoulder for 700m
· Went into a recovery vehicle that had two people between the truck and the vehicle, killing them both
· Acquitted of the offence because he was ‘driving without awareness’ (DWA)
· Conscious of other cars but not paying full attention of what was going on around him
§ If Y stabs his father while sleepwalking, should he be guilty of murder?
§ No, but sleepwalking is classified as insane automatism (Jules Lowe acquitted of murder in 2005 under the Mental Health Act)
§ External factors: prescribed medication, being hit on the dead
§ Internal factors: mental illness (Sullivan 1983), sleepwalking (Burgess 1991)
§ Tricky case: diabetes
§ Hypoglycaemia: diabetic takes insulin then doesn’t eat/consumes alcohol > rapid confusion/aggression
· Quick 1973: insulin was an external factor = automatism
§ Hyperglycaemia: diabetic doesn’t take insulin > confusion, coma
· Hennessy 1989: underlying cause was the diabetes = internal factor = insanity?
- States of affairs:
o The external element of an offence can be satisfied by a ‘state of affairs’: e.g. being a parent of a truanting child, being drunk in charge of a vehicle
o Winzar v CC of Kent 1983:
§ Went to hospital drunk
§ Police removed and arrested him from the hospital and took him out onto the street and then arrested him for being drunk on a public highway
§ Convicted!
- Causation:
o D will not be criminally liable unless they caused the result
o Factual causation
§ ‘But for’ test
§ The consequence wouldn’t have occurred but for the actions of D
§ White 1910:
· D put poison in V’s drink
· V didn’t drink it because she died before (unrelated)
· D’s actions had no influence on her death
o Legal causation
§ Mitchell 1983:
· A hit B, B fell into C, C died
· A was convicted
§ Dyson 1908:
· 3 month old child died from meningitis but the father of the child had fractured his/her skull and was convicted of manslaughter
o Intervening events:
§ ‘Act of God’: naturally occurring subsequent events
· Causation is attributed to D unless the intervening natural event was not reasonably foreseeable
· To break the chain of causation, D’s act must no longer be a substantial and operating cause of the result
§ Third party intervention:
· A voluntary intervention on the part of a third party will be classified as a novus actus and break the chain of causation
· Cheshire 1991:
o D shot V
o Two months later, V had breathing difficulties (still in hospital)
o Two weeks after this, V died of cardio-respiratory arrest due to a condition produced as a result of the tube inserted
o D was convicted of murder:
§ D had responsibility because the treatment was not independent of his actions – D’s actions were significant
· Jordan 1956:
o V received ‘palpably wrong’ medical treatment after being stabbed
o V had been allergic to a drug he’d been given
o Stab wound had mainly healed by the time he died
o “A very particular case depending on its exact facts.”
· Smith 1959:
o D stabbed V several times with a bayonet and pierced his lung
o V was carried to the medical room and dropped twice on the way
o Seriousness of injuries not properly recognized or treated
o D was convicted:
§ If the second event is so overwhelming as to make the original wound part of the history, they wouldn’t be convicted
· Mellor 1996:
o D attacked V, left with minor injuries that weakened him, died two days later
o Cause of death was pneumonia
o D convicted of murder – appealed: V hadn’t been given an adequate dose of oxygen
o Injuries were a significant cause of death (don’t have to be the only cause) – D liable
· McKechnie 1992: (omission)
o Elderly V attacked, got serious head injuries
o When taken to hospital, they discovered an ulcer
o Hospital couldn’t remove ulcer because he was in such a critical state
o Ulcer burst, V died
o Omission didn’t break the chain of causation here
· Pagett 1983:
o D took pregnant girlfriend hostage and used her as a shield when firing at police officers
o Police officers couldn’t see as it was too dark, D shot out, police fired back and killed her
o Convicted: involuntary act of self-defense shouldn’t absolve D of responsibility
o Set up a chain of events that resulted in V’s death
§ Actions of the victim:
· V’s actions will break the chain of causation if his actions are free, deliberate (conscious) and informed
· Drug administration:
o Kennedy (No.2) 2005:
§ D supplied heroin for V, prepared the syringe and left the room
§ V overdosed and died
§ D convicted of manslaughter: appealed
§ Upheld at AC
o 2007:
§ House of Lords said D was not guilty of unlawful act manslaughter where V is a fully informed adult making a voluntary decision to inject
· Escape cases:
o Don’t look at what V would’ve seen as foreseeable but what any person would see: reasonability of reaction doesn’t matter
o Objective standard
o Williams 1992:
§ V was a hitch-hiker, jumped out of moving car because of robbery, Ds were convicted of manslaughter
o Holland 1841:
§ D cut V’s hand and V was advised to have it amputated
§ V refused and died of tetanus
§ V would’ve survived if he had had the amputation
§ D remained guilty of murder – was the wound the cause of death?
o Blaue 1975:
§ Thin skull principle
§ Take victim as you find them (pre-existing conditions and beliefs)
§ D stabbed V for refusing sex
§ V lost blood, needed a blood transfusion – Jehovah’s witness refused
§ If she didn’t have it she’d die, agreed to this
§ V died – D convicted of manslaughter
§ Focus not on whether V’s actions were reasonable
o Dhaliwal 2006:
§ V committed suicide after enduring prolonged abuse from D
§ Court was open to the argument that a suicide was influenced by D’s abuse could be considered an event caused by D
· Matthews and Alleyne 2003:
o Student robbed and thrown over a bridge
o ‘… The law has not yet reached a definition of intent in murder in terms of appreciation of a virtual certainty.’
· In the ‘real’ world, the Woollin direction is only for rare cases
Motive shouldn’t generally be considered: only the mens rea.
- Hard cases:
o Duress:
§ Steane 1947:
· ‘… Doing an act likely to assist the enemy with the intent to assist the enemy.’
· Broadcasted for the enemy because he was told that if he didn’t, his wife and children would be killed
· He had a good motive – to protect his family
· Hadn’t had the intention to assist the enemy
· Blurred: to assist the family he had to intend to assist the enemy?
· Difficult case!
o The medical context:
§ Gillick 1988:
· Challenged memorandum from department of health about doctors giving contraceptive advice to under 16 year olds
· Does it abet sexual intercourse?
· Best interest of the child in that situation: no guilty mind
· By giving contraception, it is not aiding underage sex
· … But would the u16 only have sex if they had contraception?
§ Re A (Conjoined Twins) 2000:
· If they weren’t separated they’d die within 3 months
· If they were separated, one would die
· Weaker twin couldn’t survive by herself
· Parents didn’t want them to be separated
· Legally, the doctors intended to kill one twin (indirectly, under the Woollin definition)
· Some reference to Woollin ‘intention’
§ It seems that the courts take motive into account when it suits them: they ‘work backwards’ because they want to justify the fairest outcome
§ ‘Moral elbow room’ might be a positive development
o Transferred intention
§ Latimer 1886-90:
· Intended recipient of blow was not the eventual recipient
§ Mitchell 1983:
· Assault not directed at eventual victim doesn’t mean they are not liable
§ A-G’s reference (No. 3 of 1994) 1997:
· Man was in dispute with the woman he had impregnated
· He stabbed her
· Child was born prematurely then died
· Mother survived
· Had he murdered the child?
· Victim cannot be classed as a person/being until you have independent existent from the mother
· Intention to murder the mother could not be transferred to the child
· Can’t have a double transfer of intention
· Mother > unborn child > child
· No double transfer, but could be liable for manslaughter… Still double transfer!
§ Pembliton 1874:
· Can’t transfer mens rea from one offence to another
· Tried to hit a person with a stone, hit a window instead
· Mens rea wasn’t for the damage to the window
· If it is the same offence, different victim, means rea is transferable
· If it is a different offence, it is not transferable
§ Ellis 1986:
· Intended to important large amounts of cannabis
· Charged with knowing he had cannabis
· He thought he was importing pornography, not cannabis
· Mens rea was to import prohibited material – liable
o Reform:
§ Draft Criminal Code Bill: intention definition
§ E.g. Father with baby on top of burning building, he throws baby off the building in the hope that someone will catch it, direct intention to help child, no intention to harm child – under this Bill, he could be held liable
§ Duress is no defense to murder
§ ‘Linguistically and morally wrong’
§ Law Commission 1992 recognised earlier criticisms
§ New definition of ‘oblique intent’
§ Usually ignored
§ Law Commission 2005 proposed two models for intention
§ Regarded defenses to murder
§ Proposed two models for intention
§ Definitional approach: this is intention: if the case meets the criteria, intention is found – no moral elbow room
§ Common law approach: if they satisfy the criteria, it may be intention (some moral elbow room)
Duty to act: Statutory, contractual, pubic office, assumption of responsibility, creation of dangerous situation, special relationship.
Statutory Duty: For example, Children + Young Persons Act 1933 s1: Adults can not neglect their children
Contractual Duty: Doctor/patient; Childminder/child in care; R v Pittwood 1902: D had a contractual obligation to his employers, so he had a contractual duty towards the members of the public to make sure that people crossing the rail road did so safely when a train wasn't coming.
Public Office: R v Dytham 1979: police officer watched someone being beaten to death, misconduct of officer in justice. His decision to stand by was so bad that it could be considered wilful neglect and warranted condemnation and punishment.
Assumption of Responsibility: R v Instan 1893: D lived with and maintained his 73 year old aunt, previously been healthy but started suffering gangrene in the leg - only D knew. D: continued to live with aunt, took food in but didn't give her any, didn't seek medical attention, didn't tell neighbours or other family members. Cause of Death: exhaustion caused by gangrene but substantially accelerated by lack of food, nursing, medical attention. D convicted of Gross Neg Manslaughter. CA: She was under a moral obligation to her aunt food, from which a legal duty arose towards her. She wilfully neglected to do so. R v Gibbons and Proctor 1918: G and P lived in house with a number of P's children including V. V was kept apart from the other children. however starved to death. AC: Upheld the conviction. G provided money for food but was aware that the child was not being fed. He knew the P hated her and that no doctor had been called. P was her mother and had a duty to use the money received for food to feed her children and get medical attention. R v Stone + Dobinson 1977: Stone was 67 and Dobinson was 43. They lived with Stone's younger sister, V (61). V paid rent, ate very little (anorexic). S and D tried twice to locate her a doctor D and Neighbour washed V once, D told pub landlady she was worried. V wouldn't wash, eat or go to the toilet. V died. Room was covered in excrement, a scene of 'dreadful degradation ' V: naked, emaciated, dirty, lying in a pool of excrement and urine. D said V had never complained but that she had told S about her concerns. AC: Rejected appeal. V was a blood relative of S. V occupied a house in their home, D had tried to wash her and had taken food to her, S and D both knew of her poor condition. This was not a situation analogous to the drowning stranger, they made efforts to care, tried to get a doctor, they tried to discover the previous doctor, the appellant Dobinson held with the washing and the provision of food. In order to avoid liability you must not assume responsibility for the person whom needs care!
Creation of a dangerous situation: R v Miller 1983: found a mattress to sleep on, started fire by cigarette. Had nothing to put the fire out with so just left. HOL considered two theories which could be adopted to explain how the AR and MR could coincide. Duty/responsibility theory: if you set in motion a sequence of events and become aware of the fact it could be dangerous, you are under a duty to take steps to prevent what you have done. if you do not do so the mens rea for the offence occurs at this point. Other theory was that it was one continuous act: once he decided he wasn't going to do anything, he had the mens rea. Evans 2009: E supplied half sister (V) heroin. E and mother spotted overdose symptoms and tended to her for part of the night. She seemed to be improving. V died from heroin overdose. Both convicted of Gross Negligence Manslaughter. E appealed: the duty necessary to find gross negligence manslaughter was not confined to cases of a familial or professional relationship between the D and the deceased. For the purpose of the offence when a person has created or contributed to the creation of affairs which tthey knew or ought to of known had become life-threatening a consequent duty on him to act would be imposed.
Special Relationship: Spouses, siblings and children, parent relationships.
- Airedale NHS Trust v Bland 1993
o B had been at the Hillsborough disaster, survived but was in a vegetative state
o No further interest in being kept alive as there was no chance of recovery
o If treatment were withdrawn, would it be a breach of the doctors’ duty of care?
- Voluntary conduct:
o The accused must have a sufficient degree of control so they can fairly be punished for their actions
o D must be responsible for the behavior element of the actus reus
o If they don’t have control, they are in a state of ‘automatism’
§ Must’ve suffered a complete loss of voluntary control, caused by an external factor
§ D mustn’t be at fault in losing their control
§ If D is attacked by bees while he is driving and hits a parked car, he is not guilty of driving without due care and attention
§ Hill v Baxter 1958:
· D was charged with dangerous driving
· D claimed he had become unconscious at the wheel
· Held that if you are in the driving seat of a car, it is presumed that you are driving it, unless there is evidence to the contrary (e.g. epileptic fit, coma, attack by swarm of bees etc.)
· If you can predict that you may have an epileptic fit, there is a question as to whether the driver was reckless/dangerous
· If someone falls asleep, there was an earlier time when he was falling asleep and failed to perform the ‘elementary duty’ of staying awake
§ AG’s Reference (No. 2 of 1992) 1993:
· HGV driver killed two people on the motorway
· Three way motorway temporarily went into two lanes
· Driver steered onto the hard shoulder for 700m
· Went into a recovery vehicle that had two people between the truck and the vehicle, killing them both
· Acquitted of the offence because he was ‘driving without awareness’ (DWA)
· Conscious of other cars but not paying full attention of what was going on around him
§ If Y stabs his father while sleepwalking, should he be guilty of murder?
§ No, but sleepwalking is classified as insane automatism (Jules Lowe acquitted of murder in 2005 under the Mental Health Act)
§ External factors: prescribed medication, being hit on the dead
§ Internal factors: mental illness (Sullivan 1983), sleepwalking (Burgess 1991)
§ Tricky case: diabetes
§ Hypoglycaemia: diabetic takes insulin then doesn’t eat/consumes alcohol > rapid confusion/aggression
· Quick 1973: insulin was an external factor = automatism
§ Hyperglycaemia: diabetic doesn’t take insulin > confusion, coma
· Hennessy 1989: underlying cause was the diabetes = internal factor = insanity?
- States of affairs:
o The external element of an offence can be satisfied by a ‘state of affairs’: e.g. being a parent of a truanting child, being drunk in charge of a vehicle
o Winzar v CC of Kent 1983:
§ Went to hospital drunk
§ Police removed and arrested him from the hospital and took him out onto the street and then arrested him for being drunk on a public highway
§ Convicted!
- Causation:
o D will not be criminally liable unless they caused the result
o Factual causation
§ ‘But for’ test
§ The consequence wouldn’t have occurred but for the actions of D
§ White 1910:
· D put poison in V’s drink
· V didn’t drink it because she died before (unrelated)
· D’s actions had no influence on her death
o Legal causation
§ Mitchell 1983:
· A hit B, B fell into C, C died
· A was convicted
§ Dyson 1908:
· 3 month old child died from meningitis but the father of the child had fractured his/her skull and was convicted of manslaughter
o Intervening events:
§ ‘Act of God’: naturally occurring subsequent events
· Causation is attributed to D unless the intervening natural event was not reasonably foreseeable
· To break the chain of causation, D’s act must no longer be a substantial and operating cause of the result
§ Third party intervention:
· A voluntary intervention on the part of a third party will be classified as a novus actus and break the chain of causation
· Cheshire 1991:
o D shot V
o Two months later, V had breathing difficulties (still in hospital)
o Two weeks after this, V died of cardio-respiratory arrest due to a condition produced as a result of the tube inserted
o D was convicted of murder:
§ D had responsibility because the treatment was not independent of his actions – D’s actions were significant
· Jordan 1956:
o V received ‘palpably wrong’ medical treatment after being stabbed
o V had been allergic to a drug he’d been given
o Stab wound had mainly healed by the time he died
o “A very particular case depending on its exact facts.”
· Smith 1959:
o D stabbed V several times with a bayonet and pierced his lung
o V was carried to the medical room and dropped twice on the way
o Seriousness of injuries not properly recognized or treated
o D was convicted:
§ If the second event is so overwhelming as to make the original wound part of the history, they wouldn’t be convicted
· Mellor 1996:
o D attacked V, left with minor injuries that weakened him, died two days later
o Cause of death was pneumonia
o D convicted of murder – appealed: V hadn’t been given an adequate dose of oxygen
o Injuries were a significant cause of death (don’t have to be the only cause) – D liable
· McKechnie 1992: (omission)
o Elderly V attacked, got serious head injuries
o When taken to hospital, they discovered an ulcer
o Hospital couldn’t remove ulcer because he was in such a critical state
o Ulcer burst, V died
o Omission didn’t break the chain of causation here
· Pagett 1983:
o D took pregnant girlfriend hostage and used her as a shield when firing at police officers
o Police officers couldn’t see as it was too dark, D shot out, police fired back and killed her
o Convicted: involuntary act of self-defense shouldn’t absolve D of responsibility
o Set up a chain of events that resulted in V’s death
§ Actions of the victim:
· V’s actions will break the chain of causation if his actions are free, deliberate (conscious) and informed
· Drug administration:
o Kennedy (No.2) 2005:
§ D supplied heroin for V, prepared the syringe and left the room
§ V overdosed and died
§ D convicted of manslaughter: appealed
§ Upheld at AC
o 2007:
§ House of Lords said D was not guilty of unlawful act manslaughter where V is a fully informed adult making a voluntary decision to inject
· Escape cases:
o Don’t look at what V would’ve seen as foreseeable but what any person would see: reasonability of reaction doesn’t matter
o Objective standard
o Williams 1992:
§ V was a hitch-hiker, jumped out of moving car because of robbery, Ds were convicted of manslaughter
o Holland 1841:
§ D cut V’s hand and V was advised to have it amputated
§ V refused and died of tetanus
§ V would’ve survived if he had had the amputation
§ D remained guilty of murder – was the wound the cause of death?
o Blaue 1975:
§ Thin skull principle
§ Take victim as you find them (pre-existing conditions and beliefs)
§ D stabbed V for refusing sex
§ V lost blood, needed a blood transfusion – Jehovah’s witness refused
§ If she didn’t have it she’d die, agreed to this
§ V died – D convicted of manslaughter
§ Focus not on whether V’s actions were reasonable
o Dhaliwal 2006:
§ V committed suicide after enduring prolonged abuse from D
§ Court was open to the argument that a suicide was influenced by D’s abuse could be considered an event caused by D
· Matthews and Alleyne 2003:
o Student robbed and thrown over a bridge
o ‘… The law has not yet reached a definition of intent in murder in terms of appreciation of a virtual certainty.’
· In the ‘real’ world, the Woollin direction is only for rare cases
Motive shouldn’t generally be considered: only the mens rea.
- Hard cases:
o Duress:
§ Steane 1947:
· ‘… Doing an act likely to assist the enemy with the intent to assist the enemy.’
· Broadcasted for the enemy because he was told that if he didn’t, his wife and children would be killed
· He had a good motive – to protect his family
· Hadn’t had the intention to assist the enemy
· Blurred: to assist the family he had to intend to assist the enemy?
· Difficult case!
o The medical context:
§ Gillick 1988:
· Challenged memorandum from department of health about doctors giving contraceptive advice to under 16 year olds
· Does it abet sexual intercourse?
· Best interest of the child in that situation: no guilty mind
· By giving contraception, it is not aiding underage sex
· … But would the u16 only have sex if they had contraception?
§ Re A (Conjoined Twins) 2000:
· If they weren’t separated they’d die within 3 months
· If they were separated, one would die
· Weaker twin couldn’t survive by herself
· Parents didn’t want them to be separated
· Legally, the doctors intended to kill one twin (indirectly, under the Woollin definition)
· Some reference to Woollin ‘intention’
§ It seems that the courts take motive into account when it suits them: they ‘work backwards’ because they want to justify the fairest outcome
§ ‘Moral elbow room’ might be a positive development
o Transferred intention
§ Latimer 1886-90:
· Intended recipient of blow was not the eventual recipient
§ Mitchell 1983:
· Assault not directed at eventual victim doesn’t mean they are not liable
§ A-G’s reference (No. 3 of 1994) 1997:
· Man was in dispute with the woman he had impregnated
· He stabbed her
· Child was born prematurely then died
· Mother survived
· Had he murdered the child?
· Victim cannot be classed as a person/being until you have independent existent from the mother
· Intention to murder the mother could not be transferred to the child
· Can’t have a double transfer of intention
· Mother > unborn child > child
· No double transfer, but could be liable for manslaughter… Still double transfer!
§ Pembliton 1874:
· Can’t transfer mens rea from one offence to another
· Tried to hit a person with a stone, hit a window instead
· Mens rea wasn’t for the damage to the window
· If it is the same offence, different victim, means rea is transferable
· If it is a different offence, it is not transferable
§ Ellis 1986:
· Intended to important large amounts of cannabis
· Charged with knowing he had cannabis
· He thought he was importing pornography, not cannabis
· Mens rea was to import prohibited material – liable
o Reform:
§ Draft Criminal Code Bill: intention definition
§ E.g. Father with baby on top of burning building, he throws baby off the building in the hope that someone will catch it, direct intention to help child, no intention to harm child – under this Bill, he could be held liable
§ Duress is no defense to murder
§ ‘Linguistically and morally wrong’
§ Law Commission 1992 recognised earlier criticisms
§ New definition of ‘oblique intent’
§ Usually ignored
§ Law Commission 2005 proposed two models for intention
§ Regarded defenses to murder
§ Proposed two models for intention
§ Definitional approach: this is intention: if the case meets the criteria, intention is found – no moral elbow room
§ Common law approach: if they satisfy the criteria, it may be intention (some moral elbow room)
Duty to act: Statutory, contractual, pubic office, assumption of responsibility, creation of dangerous situation, special relationship.
Statutory Duty: For example, Children + Young Persons Act 1933 s1: Adults can not neglect their children
Contractual Duty: Doctor/patient; Childminder/child in care; R v Pittwood 1902: D had a contractual obligation to his employers, so he had a contractual duty towards the members of the public to make sure that people crossing the rail road did so safely when a train wasn't coming.
Public Office: R v Dytham 1979: police officer watched someone being beaten to death, misconduct of officer in justice. His decision to stand by was so bad that it could be considered wilful neglect and warranted condemnation and punishment.
Assumption of Responsibility: R v Instan 1893: D lived with and maintained his 73 year old aunt, previously been healthy but started suffering gangrene in the leg - only D knew. D: continued to live with aunt, took food in but didn't give her any, didn't seek medical attention, didn't tell neighbours or other family members. Cause of Death: exhaustion caused by gangrene but substantially accelerated by lack of food, nursing, medical attention. D convicted of Gross Neg Manslaughter. CA: She was under a moral obligation to her aunt food, from which a legal duty arose towards her. She wilfully neglected to do so. R v Gibbons and Proctor 1918: G and P lived in house with a number of P's children including V. V was kept apart from the other children. however starved to death. AC: Upheld the conviction. G provided money for food but was aware that the child was not being fed. He knew the P hated her and that no doctor had been called. P was her mother and had a duty to use the money received for food to feed her children and get medical attention. R v Stone + Dobinson 1977: Stone was 67 and Dobinson was 43. They lived with Stone's younger sister, V (61). V paid rent, ate very little (anorexic). S and D tried twice to locate her a doctor D and Neighbour washed V once, D told pub landlady she was worried. V wouldn't wash, eat or go to the toilet. V died. Room was covered in excrement, a scene of 'dreadful degradation ' V: naked, emaciated, dirty, lying in a pool of excrement and urine. D said V had never complained but that she had told S about her concerns. AC: Rejected appeal. V was a blood relative of S. V occupied a house in their home, D had tried to wash her and had taken food to her, S and D both knew of her poor condition. This was not a situation analogous to the drowning stranger, they made efforts to care, tried to get a doctor, they tried to discover the previous doctor, the appellant Dobinson held with the washing and the provision of food. In order to avoid liability you must not assume responsibility for the person whom needs care!
Creation of a dangerous situation: R v Miller 1983: found a mattress to sleep on, started fire by cigarette. Had nothing to put the fire out with so just left. HOL considered two theories which could be adopted to explain how the AR and MR could coincide. Duty/responsibility theory: if you set in motion a sequence of events and become aware of the fact it could be dangerous, you are under a duty to take steps to prevent what you have done. if you do not do so the mens rea for the offence occurs at this point. Other theory was that it was one continuous act: once he decided he wasn't going to do anything, he had the mens rea. Evans 2009: E supplied half sister (V) heroin. E and mother spotted overdose symptoms and tended to her for part of the night. She seemed to be improving. V died from heroin overdose. Both convicted of Gross Negligence Manslaughter. E appealed: the duty necessary to find gross negligence manslaughter was not confined to cases of a familial or professional relationship between the D and the deceased. For the purpose of the offence when a person has created or contributed to the creation of affairs which tthey knew or ought to of known had become life-threatening a consequent duty on him to act would be imposed.
Special Relationship: Spouses, siblings and children, parent relationships.